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I. INTRODUCTION
"Saleh"' heeded the United States' call for capable and willing Iraqis to
return to Baghdad to help rebuild Iraq in the days following the American
invasion. In the early 1990s, he had fled from Iraq and went to Sweden to escape
Saddam Hussein's regime of terror and imprisonment.' As he crossed back into
Iraq in 2003, U.S. troops stopped him, arrested him, and seized his car and the
$70,000 cash he brought to help start a business. He was taken to Abu Ghraib in
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Baghdad, where he remained for three months.5 This was not his first time in Abu
Ghraib, having been sent there by Saddam Hussein for political opposition.6
But according to Saleh, his second stay, under the "control" of American
troops and civilian contractors at the prison, was his worst experience. While in
custody, government contractors and military personnel beat his genitals with a
stick. Saleh had his genitals tied to those of other prisoners and they were pushed
and knocked to the ground one at a time.' Saleh was beaten, shocked with
electricity, dragged around the cell block by a belt around his neck, and forced to
perform sexual acts in front of jailers and other prisoners.9 Amazingly, Saleh was
never charged with any crime or found to be a spy or Saddam supporter, and was
released after three months from Abu Ghraib.'
Saleh's is but one story that depicts torture activities occurring in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Cuba that have shocked the world." Other prisoners at Abu
Ghraib report being sodomized, urinated upon, or taunted with growling dogs.'
2
These tortuous claims have become the focus of widespread media attention'3 and
two official investigations conducted by the U.S. Army."4 In response to the
actions at Abu Ghraib, at least two civil lawsuits have been filed against Titan
Corporation, Incorporated of San Diego, California and CACI Incorporated of
Arlington, Virginia. In both Ibrahim v. Titan Corporation, Inc.'5 and Saleh v.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.; see also Major General Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military
Police Brigade (Mar. 9, 2004), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=417&sid=100
[hereinafter Taguba Report] (documenting physical abuses to prisoner genitals and acts of sodomy and sexual
perversion).
8. See Hastings, supra note 2, at IA; see also Taguba Report, supra note 7 (documenting physical
abuses to prisoner genitals and acts of sodomy and sexual perversion).
9. See Hastings, supra note 2, at LA; see also Major General George Fay, Article 15-6 Investigation of
the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (Aug. 23, 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.con/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf [hereinafter Fay Report] (describing various incidents
of physical abuse on detainees at Abu Ghraib).
10. Hastings, supra note 2, at IA.
11. The incidents described herein were not isolated events. See, e.g., James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of
the Independent Panel To Review DOD Detention Operations 12 (2004) [hereinafter Schlesinger Report], available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (noting approximately 300 separate
allegations and 66 confirmed instances of detainee abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba). See also Dan Eggen & R.
Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at Al
(reporting that an FBI agent at Guantanamo Bay witnessed detainees being subjected to abuse, including being
"shackled to the floor in fetal positions" for days at a time, deprived of food and water, and left "to defecate on
themselves").
12. See Second Amended Complaint at 38, Ibrahim v. Titan, Corp., 2006 WL 3570443 (Jan 1, 2004)
(listing eight specific acts of physical abuse allegedly committed while Mr. Saddam Aboud was incarcerated at
Abu Ghriab).
13. See, e.g., the thirty-two consecutive days of front page stories by THE NEW YORK TIMES on Abu
Ghraib, starting April 29, 2004 and ending June 2, 2004.
14. See Fay Report, supra note 9, at 48; see also Taguba Report, supra note 7 (documenting physical
abuses to prisoner genitals and acts of sodomy and sexual perversion).
15. 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
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Titan Corporation, Inc. , 6 the plaintiffs accuse the defendant government
contractors of tortuous activities including assault and battery, wrongful death,
torture, crimes against humanity, sexual assault and battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional harm. The defendant contractors provided translators and
interrogators to the U.S. military. These contractors have been directly suspected
by the U.S. Army as participating in the abuses at Abu Ghraib.'7
With the universal condemnation of torture18  and specific U.S. law
prohibiting the acts of torture,' 9 one would believe that Saleh and the hundreds of
other detainees in Abu Ghraib, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay would have a
legal remedy for damages. However, assuming the U.S. government and Army
may avoid liability in a civil action on the premise of sovereign immunity,2' the
detainees' only option to recover damages for their torture and imprisonment
may be against the individual captors and the private contractors who employed
21them.
Without the benefit of legal protection from U.S. contractors within the Iraqi
legal system,22 the parties have turned to U.S. federal courts. Despite the
procedural mechanisms that allow the plaintiffs to sue U.S. corporations in
federal court," a significant substantive barrier stands in between Saleh and the
other detainees who were imprisoned and abused at the hands of civilian
contractors: the government contractor defense.24
16. 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
17. Fay Report, supra note 9, at 48.
18. United Nation Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, enacted into force June 26, 1987
[hereinafter UN Convention].
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2004) (creating a federal crime for torture committed outside the United
States).
20. See generally U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) (holding that the federal government has
sovereign immunity from suit unless it explicitly waives immunity by statute).
21. Torture Victim Protection Act, PL 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (stating that "an individual who,
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law .... subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual").
22. In June 2003, Paul Bremer, U.S. Head of the Iraqi Provisional Authority, issued an order protecting
contractors from any threat of civil or criminal suit in Iraqi courts, even for intentional torts and violent crimes.
Joanne Mariner, Private Contractors Who Torture, CNN ONLINE, June 17, 2004, available at http://www.cnn.
com/2004/LAW/06/1 7/mariner.contractors.
23. Assuming that the Alien Tort Clams Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, would be sufficient to allow the district court jurisdiction in these matters. For more information
on the subject, see generally Scott J. Borrowman [student author], Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib -
Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005
B.Y.U. L. REV. 371 (2005).
24. See Anthony J. Sebok, What Tort Claims, If Any, Can Be Brought By the Inmates Who Were
Tortured in Iraq?, FindLaw Legal Commentary (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.writ.news.findlaw.
com/sebok/ 20040517.html; see also Myriam Gilles, Private Parties as Defendants in Civil Rights Litigation;
Association of American Law Schools Symposium, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7 (2004).
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This common law defense was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation.5 In Boyle, a 5-4 court held that
exemptions found in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") included immunity
for military contractors manufacturing military equipment in accordance with
approved government specifications. 6 The lower courts' expansion of the
defense has been ongoing since its creation to include service contracts and
contracts not involving military equipment.27 Additionally, the Court has
exhibited reluctance to review the defense or hold corporations accountable for
the actions of its employees in constitutional tort claims such as Correctional
Services Corporation v. Malesko.2 Based on this judicial trend, the government
contractor defense appears to be an available affirmative defense to defendant
corporations whose agents and employees inflicted the torture on the inmates of
Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities.
This comment takes the position that the unprecedented extension of private
military contractors into roles traditionally held by military personnel,
specifically paramilitary operations such as interrogation and prisoner of war
detention, is an anomaly outside the Court's reasoning in Boyle. Specifically, the
government contractor defense in these cases is outside the scope of Boyle,
inappropriate in light of the rationale underlying Boyle and Malesko, and would
have damaging consequences for the American reputation in the world
community. Allowing the military to "outsource" these specialized roles is
beyond the limited scope of the military contractor providing equipment for
which Boyle found immunity under the FTCA. Therefore, the extension of the
government contractor defense is unwarranted in the specific context of
contractors acting in the traditionally military roles of interrogators and
translators in prisoner of war facilities.
Furthermore, the use of the government contractor defense as an affirmative
defense to constitutional tort claims29 is inappropriate for private military
contractors who act in the roles of interrogators and other paramilitary operations
traditionally held by the military. The reasoning found in Malesko does not apply
where the agent's employer is not a government entity, or where the parent
corporation actually publishes operating procedures or encourages the actions
that result in the tortuous activity.3 0
25. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
26. Id.
27. See Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (announcing
elements for government contractor defense as applied to service contracts); Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991
F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that government contractor defense applies to all government contractors).
28. See Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding that private cause of action
against government contractor was not available to injured prisoner because deterrence of the tortuous conduct
was not likely by the imposition of liability).
29. See, e.g., Malesko v. Correctional Serv. Corp., 299 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2000).
30. See Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); OF-347, Contract Order for Supplies
and Services entered into between CACI, International and the U.S. Dept. of the Interior, March 1, 2004, at 1,
470
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Finally, there are clear statements by Congress and the world community
condemning torture and tortuous oppression by occupying armies.3 The policy
rationale underlying Boyle, its progeny, and Malesko are particularly flawed in
the situation where the use of the government contractor defense would leave the
plaintiffs with no alternative method of recovery."
Section II of this comment will briefly address the facts that have led up to
the present lawsuits against Titan Corporation and CACI Incorporated.
Specifically, this section of the comment highlights the differences between
traditional private military contractor roles involving non-paramilitary
operations, such as infrastructure rebuilding, and tort claims resulting from the
use of civilian contractors in paramilitary roles such as interrogators.
Additionally, this section will note the clear statements by Congress and the
world community condemning torture and tortuous oppression by occupying
armies.33
Section III provides the legal background of Boyle, Malesko, and recent
Supreme Court analysis of state law tort claims against contractors and
government entities. Section IV provides an analysis of the government
contractor defense as applied to the facts of Ibrahim v. Titan Corporation4 and
Saleh v. Titan Corporation.35 This section examines the policy concerns behind
the government contractor defense. Section V concludes with the belief that the
government contractor defense as laid forth in Boyle should not apply to the facts
presented in the torture cases stemming from Abu Ghraib.
II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Private Military Contractors
Government sponsored private military services have a long and
distinguished history. Thought of as mercenaries today, Alexander the Great,
Caesar, and the British Empire each employed foreign military units to fight in
combat.36 In 1969, the U.S. Army implemented procedures for outsourcing
available at http://www.publicintegrity.org /docs/wow/CACI ordersAll.pdf (holding that private cause of
action against government contract was not available to injured prisoner because deterrence of the tortuous
conduct was not likely by the imposition of liability).
31. See, e.g., Associated Press, House Vote Boosts McCain's Ban on Torture, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2005, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20051214-115713-5460r.htm; UN Convention, supra
note 18.
32. This comment assumes the U.S. government would be immune from suit under sovereign immunity,
and that the private contractors would be immune from suit in Iraq. See supra text accompanying note 23.
33. See supra text accompanying note 31.
34. 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
35. 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (S.D. CA. 2005).
36. See Todd S. Millard, Overcoming Post Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private
Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2003) (noting that the use of hired armies is common through
history).
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logistical support.37 Since then, the United States has spent millions of dollars in
private military contracts for training, logistics, intelligence, and com-
38munications. Outsourcing to private contracts for military flight training, 9 fuel
supplies,4° and telecommunications have become commonplace during the past
twenty years.4' Some modem campaigns, such as the "War on Drugs", were
waged with private military contractors when formal military combat activities
were not authorized by Congress. 2 A recent U.S. Government Accounting Office
report noted that since the early 1990s, the Department of Defense has used
private military contractors to "meet many of its logistical and operational
support needs during combat operations, peacekeeping missions, and
humanitarian assistance missions, ranging from Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan. 43 It appears that, in light of current defense priorities
and man-power shortages, private military contractors are invaluable to national
defense.an
During the current conflict in Iraq, the U.S. government employed one
private contractor for every ten active-duty military service members deployed in
the region-nearly ten times the number used in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.45
With current U.S. Army troop number estimates at nearly 140,000,46
approximately 20,000 civilians are acting in support, logistics, and paramilitary
roles in Iraq alone.47
37. Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian
Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 235 (2000).
38. See Barry Yeoman, Soldiers of Good Fortune, Mother Jones, May/June 2003, available at
http://www.motherjones.comnews/feature/2003/05/ma_365_01.html (reporting that private military contractors
enjoy an estimated $100 billion annually).
39. CSC News Release, CSC Wins $1.1 Billion Army Flight School XXI Simulation Contract, Sept. 29,
2003, available at http://www.csc.com/newsandevents/news/2289.shtml.
40. See, e.g., Arctic Slope World Services Current Contracts Webpage, http://asws.asrcfederal.coml
current/current.asp?page=army (claiming Army refueling contracts at three bases in Alabama) (on file with the
Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal).
41. See, e.g., Roseanne Gerin, MTC Tapped by Air Force for Communication Support, Oct. 20, 2005,
available at http://www.washingtontechnology.co /news/1 1/telecom-it-infrastructure/27234- 1.html (noting
the Air Force and other Defense Department's $2.5 billion worth of annual communications projects).
42. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Noshua Watson, The Pentagon's Private Army, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2003
at 100, 103, available at 2003 WL 13891324 ("At least a half-dozen companies. . . receive up to $1.2 billion a
year from the Pentagon and the State Department to fly the planes that spray suspected coca fields and to
monitor smugglers from remote radar sites.").
43. GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate, June 2003 at 4, available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03695.pdf [hereinafter
GAO Report].
44. Id. at 18.
45. Kenneth Bredemeier, Thousands of Private Contractors Support U.S. Forces in Persian Gulf,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2003, at E01.
46. Transcript of radio interview with Sec. of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, Jan. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060l27-12392.html.
47. Deborah Avant, What Are Those Contractors Doing in Iraq?, WASH. POST, May 9, 2004 at BI;
P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004 at B3.
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After the events of September 1 lth, the U.S. military is almost entirely
48dependant on translation services for operations in Arabic-speaking countries.
The shortage of Arabic-speaking military personnel resulted in a number of
private military contractors vying for contracts to provide translators and
linguists to the Army.49  Contacts were made to provide translators and
intelligence specialists at Abu Ghraib prison for translation services and
interrogation of Iraqi prisoners after the U.S. invasion of Baghdad. ° Testimonies
from both prisoners and military personnel in Abu Ghraib at the time indicate
that contractors from at least two U.S. companies directly participated in the
abuses.5
In response, at least two lawsuits have been filed against Titan Corporation
of San Diego, California, and CACI Incorporated of Arlington, Virginia.52
Ibrahim was brought by seven Iraqi nationals on behalf of themselves or their
deceased husbands.53 Saleh has been filed as a class action with ten named
individuals or estates and over 1000 unnamed plaintiffs who were imprisoned or
tortured by the contractors.4 These suits target two corporations that provided
translators and interrogators to the U.S. military for use in Abu Ghraib prison
between 2003 and 2004."5 In particular, the suits allege that while acting under
color of U.S. law, specific individuals employed by the contractors committed
crimes such as rape, assault, battery, false imprisonment, torture, and wrongful
death, among other tortuous activities upon the plaintiffs.56 Alleging negligence
and the theory of respondent superior, among other charges under RICO, the
plaintiffs filed suit against the private military contractors that employed the
individual interrogators and translators. 7 The plaintiffs are seeking compensatory
and punitive damages in the millions of dollars.58
48. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred Between Soldiers and Civilian
Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al.
49. See James Bernstein, Speaking Their Language: $3.1B in Contracts, NEWSDAY, Sept. 30, 2005,
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050930-language-contracts.htm (reporting the
Army's request for bids on nearly $3.1 billion in translation contracts).
50. See Taguba Report, supra note 7; Tara McKelvey, Torture Inc., LEGAL AFFAIRS 13 (Oct. 2005),
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2005/scene-mckelvey-sepoctO5.msp (noting
that nearly CACI PT, Inc sent nearly 30 interrogators to work at Abu Ghraib in August 2003, and Titan has sent
roughly 4000 translators to Iraq).
51. See generally, Taguba Report, supra note 7; Third Amended Complaint, Saleh v. Titan Corp., Case
No. 1:05-cv-1 165, Sept. 12, 2005 (noting that the Army had hired CACI employees as interrogators, and Titan
employees as translators) [hereinafter Saleh Complaint].
52. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d
1152 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
53. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
54. Complaint, Saleh v. Titan Corporation, WL 2091778 (D.D.C. 2006).
55. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
56. Saleh Complaint, supra note 51.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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B. Applicable U.S. Law
In 1989 and again in 1991, U.S. Congress passed legislation in response to
the fact that nearly 100 countries still practiced torture in routine police and
military operations. 9 Currently, the United States provides aliens access to its
court system to redress injuries suffered from official torture inflicted by a
foreigner outside of its territorial limits.60 Additionally, a foreign victim of torture
has been able to seek redress in U.S. federal courts and obtain civil remedies
under the Alien Tort Claims Act6' (ATCA) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.62 In 1991,
Congress codified the remedial and jurisdictional basis upon which federal courts
are permitted to adjudicate claims brought by torture victims, both alien and
domestic, by enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"). The TVPA
provides that "an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law... subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual. 63
Unfortunately, all too often, military contracts are the product of political
pressure and poor oversight.64 This combination creates a host of interesting
61contractual issues best left for another forum, including: sole source contracting,
contract specifications written by contractors in violation of military protocol,66
and differing contracting procedures for differing agencies or departments within
67an agency.
The complaints allege common law torts in addition to violations of statutory
law.6
59. See, e.g., MARTIN ROBERTSON & AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 28 (1984);
see also Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-320 Sec. 2, 112 Stat. 3016 (1999) ("The American
people abhor torture by any government or person. The existence of torture creates a climate of fear and
international insecurity that affects all people.").
60. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005) (providing that "It]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States").
62. Id. § 1331 (providing that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
63. Id. § 2340.
64. See Tony Perry, Rep. Cunningham Pleads Guilty to Bribery, Resigns, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005,
available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-me-duke29nov29,0,7903329.story?coll=la-home-business
(noting that Cunningham used his committee position to "influence the appropriations of funds and the
execution of government contracts"); GAO Report, supra note 43, at 28.
65. Sheryl Elam Tappan, An Oversight Hearing on Contracting Abuses in Iraq, Comments before the
Senate Democratic Policy Committee, Sept. 10, 2004, available at: http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/hearings/
hearing 1 7/tappan.pdf.
66. David Phinney, Prison Interrogation for Profit, CORPWATCH, Sept. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.warprofiteers.com/article.php?id=l 1524.
67. General Accounting Office, Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not
Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans 26 (June 2003), available at: http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d03695.pdf.
68. See Saleh Complaint, supra note 51.
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III. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE BACKGROUND
A. Early Contractor Immunity
61
When Congress passed the FTCA, it created a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity. The Legislature specifically limited this wavier to government
employees acting within the scope of their employment.0 In defining the
parameters of the FTCA, Congress explicitly excluded "any contractor with the
United States,"'7' meaning that the U.S. government was not liable in tort under
the FTCA for acts caused by the negligence of a government contractor. The
years after the passage of the FTCA resulted in a number of federal cases where
plaintiffs attempted to hold the United States and/or their government contractors
liable in tort for damages.72 Many of these cases were brought under the FTCA
against the U.S. government for injuries resulting from interactions with military• 71
equipment.
In Feres v. United States, however, the Supreme Court held that the U.S.
government was immune from personal injury actions by active duty military
service members for injuries sustained while in military service. 4 The Court
emphasized the unique relationship between military service members and the
government, the lack of precedent allowing military personnel to recover
damages from their superiors, and other available statutory compensation
precluding military members from suing the U.S. government.
75
To circumvent Feres, the plaintiffs attempted to sue the corporations working
under contract to the U.S. military for injuries sustained from malfunctioning or
76so 6unsafe equipment. In many of such cases, the corporate defendant attempted to
69. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (1997) (authorizing recovery of damages against the
United States for harm caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of a Government employee, to the extent
that a private person would be liable under the law of the place where the conduct occurred).
70. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (2000) (defining "government employee" and "within the scope of their
employment" as applied to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346); U.S. v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-14 (1976) (court's
interpretation of the language found in § 2671).
71. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (claim against the United States for injuries
resulting from automobile accident with army vehicle); Santana v. United States, 175 F.2d 320 (" Cir. 1949)
(negligence claim against United States for injuries sustained while under care of Veterans' Administration);
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (negligence claim against government contractor
for damage to land while building dikes under government contract).
73. See, e.g., Brooks, 337 U.S. at 49 (1949) (private citizen claim against the United States for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident with an army vehicle); Whittaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010
(5th Cir. 1969) (holding military contract grenade manufacturer liable for injuries to plaintiff).
74. 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
75. Id. at 141-44.
76. See, e.g., Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 535 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1976) (claim against
aircraft manufacturer for injuries resulting from crash); Barr v. Brezina Construction Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th
Cir. 1972) (claim against government contractor for negligent construction).
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cross-claim against the U.S. for indemnity under the contract." In response, the
Supreme Court in Stencel Aero Eng'g. Corp. v. United States precluded third-
party indemnity claims against the United States where the original claim would
be precluded by the Feres rule."8
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, defendant contractors argued that the
combined holdings of Stencel and Feres created a state of immunity for military
defense contactors 9 The judicial support for this theory was strongest where the
military was involved in the action. 0 Courts reasoned that absent congressional
action, the courts should not impose liability upon the U.S. government in
military matters.8' Matters such as contract execution should be left to the
executive and legislative branches.
It was not until the Fourth Circuit announced a new "common law" military
contractor defense in Tozer v. LTV that the Supreme Court decided to reconsider
the issue. The Supreme Court formally created the government contractor
defense in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 83
B. Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation
In 1988, the Supreme Court held in Boyle that state tort law, which holds
government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment, presented
a conflict with federal policy sufficiently significant to warrant preemption of the
state tort law. 4 In Boyle, Lieutenant Boyle was killed in a helicopter crash at
sea. 8 The aircraft, designed and built by the United Technologies Corporation
under military contract, had an escape hatch that opened outward instead of
inward, and was therefore ineffective in a submerged state against the water
pressure. 6 At trial, the jury agreed with Boyle's estate that the helicopter was
negligently designed under a products liability theory and awarded damages to
77. See, e.g., Adams, 535 F.2d at 491 (defendant filed third-party complaint against the United States,
who owned aircraft that crashed causing injuries); Barr, 464 F.2d at 1141 (defendant filed third-party complaint
against the United States alleging negligent design specifications).
78. Stencel Aero Eng'g. Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977) (precluding third-party claims
for indemnity against the United States where those claims derived from claims that would themselves be
barred by Feres).
79. See, e.g., Tillett v. JI. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant contending that the
progression from Feres, barring service members from state law tort suits, to Stencel, barring contractor
indemnification claims against the government, creates an immunity only if operating in strict compliance with
government contract).
80. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as
to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.").
81. See id.
82. Tozer v. LTV, 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986) (creating elements of military contractor defense).
83. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
84. Id. at 512.
85. Id. at 502.
86. See id. at 503 (also noting that the escape hatch handle was obstructed by other equipment).
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the plaintiff." The Fourth Circuit reversed and held in a ruling released the same
day as Tozer that United Tech. Corp. was not liable because of the "military
. . I , ,,88
contractor defense.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Fourth Circuit ruling. 9
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court remanded the case to determine
whether the government contractor defense factually applied to the case.9° Justice
Scalia's analysis can be broken into two relevant areas. First, he addressed
whether preemption of state tort law would be appropriate or whether there was a
"unique federal interest" at stake.9' Second, he analyzed the scope of the defense
within the elements announced in Tozer.
92
Traditional preemption of state law is based in the inherent tension between
federalism and central government. 9 The Supremacy Clause provides that laws
of the federal government will be "the supreme Law of the Land. 94 Historically,
the courts have found preemption appropriate only in one of three cases: (1)
Congress intentionally and expressly preempted a particular state statute;95 (2) the
implied intent of Congress to preempt state law was demonstrated by
comprehensive legislation of the field;96 or (3) where enforcement of state law
would fundamentally conflict with the objectives of Congress.97
As of 1988, when Boyle was decided, there was no legislation that expressly
indemnified government contractors from state tort products liability claims.9
Therefore, the historical formulations of preemption are not appropriate where
there is no federal statute to be considered "supreme." 99 In Boyle, Justice Scalia
87. Id.
88. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 792 F.2d 413,414-15 (4th Cir. 1986).
89. See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 479 U.S. 1029 (1986) (granting cert.); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 514
(vacating and remanding for clarification of sufficiency of the evidence for directed verdict).
90. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 514.
91. ld.at506-12.
92. Id. at512-13.
93. KENNETH STARR, ET. AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES
CONFERENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 40-42 (American Bar Association 1991).
94. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
95. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (a often cited case involving direct conflict
between the California Business and Professions Code and the Federal Meat Inspection Act ("FMIA") in which
Congress specifically prohibited the imposition of "[miarking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements
in addition to, or different than, those made" under the FMIA).
96. STARR, ET. AL., supra note 93, 19-20.
97. See Id. at 27-30 (discussing various case law demonstrating conflict preemption); see also Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (holding that state statute limiting liability of government actors in civil rights
actions directly conflicted with the goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, therefore state statute was preempted).
98. Compare Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 n.l (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting the silence by Congress to pass legislation to indemnify government contractors), with Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296 (providing liability limitations, and in certain cases, complete
immunity for all third-party claims brought against manufacturers of anti-terrorism technologies for damages
resulting from terrorist acts).
99. See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000) (outlining the various types of
preemption, and noting that congressional intent to preempt must be demonstrated either through statute or
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created federal common law that displaced state tort law in the absence of
specific federal legislation.'0 The Court noted that some arenas are "so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control
that state law [should be] preempted and replaced... [by] 'federal common
law."" ' These arenas traditionally involve "uniquely federal interests,"''0 2 and fall
into two categories: (1) those in which a federal rule of decision is "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests";' 3 or (2) those in which Congress has given the
courts the power to develop substantive law.'04
The Boyle Court recognized the judicial precedent that federal law
exclusively governed the obligations and rights of the United States under
contract to another party.' 5 Additionally, the Court found a federal concern in the
imposition of civil liability on federal officials for action taken within the scope
of their duties. ,'s The Court noted that such liability was controlled by federal law
in many cases.'07 Combining the federal law precedent of contracting rights of the
United States with the liability of federal officers, the Court held that a uniquely
federal interest was present in the civil liabilities that arose from the performance
of federal procurement contracts.' °4 While contractor liability suits are typically
between private parties where federal law would not govern,' °9 the Court
rationalized that the impact of the imposition of liability on government
contractors would directly affect the interests of the United States.'"0 The Court
reasoned that allowing inconsistent lower court decisions and placing the burden
of state tort liability on military contractors would ultimately result in increased
costs passed back to the government."' Through this analysis, the Court found
that discretion in military contracting and equipment requirements involved
unique federal interests." 2
administrative regulations); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997) (discussing the need for more explicit congressional intent in preempting
state law).
100. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504; see also James L. Akers, Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation: In
Search of the Definitive Interpretation of the Government Contractor Defense, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 603 (1989).
101. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
102. Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
103. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
104. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (noting that the areas in which the court can
develop federal common law are "few and restricted").
105. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
106. Id. at 505.
107. See id. (citing six cases in which federal official liability was controlled by federal law).
108. Id. at 505-06.
109. Id. at 506 (quoting Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956)).
110. Compare id. at 507, with Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 30 (1977) (finding that federal
interests were too remote and outcome too speculative to impose federal law where third-party beneficiary sued
municipality over agreement with the FAA).
11. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
112. Id. at 507.
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However, simply finding a unique federal interest does not inevitably result
in the displacement of state law."3 Displacement will only occur where a
significant conflict exists between an identifiable unique federal interest and the
operation of state law.'"4 While appearing to sound much like a traditional
preemption standard, Justice Scalia specifically stated that the "conflict with
federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary
preemption.""' 5 In Boyle, the significant conflict existed between the contractual
duty of the manufacturer to the federal government, and the state-imposed duty
to design and manufacture products that are not unreasonably dangerous."
6
In the absence of any explicit preemption by Congress, the Court reverted to
an analysis of conflict preemption, whereby the federal law and state law could
not co-exist. Justice Scalia first looked to Feres and the doctrine that abolished
suits by military personnel in the course of their service."7 While acknowledging
the conflict, the Court found the application of the doctrine would produce
inconsistent results. ' 8 However, with regards to military equipment procurement
contracts, the Court found the proper parameters of the significant conflict within
the statutory provisions of the FTCA." 9 The Court's analysis rested heavily on
the exclusion clause of the FTCA, which provides an exemption for "[a]ny claim
... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government whether or not the discretion involved be abused."' 20
The selection of military equipment traditionally balances "many technical,
military, and even social considerations" including safety versus combat
effectiveness. 2' The Court decided that military equipment selection was a
function best left to the military, not for the courts to "second-guess" in
contradiction with the FTCA exemption.' 22 The Court found the selection of the
appropriate design for military equipment was a discretionary function.'
23
Therefore, the federal common law preemption analysis can be summarized
as follows: in order to benefit from the governmental contractor defense, the
contractor must satisfy both prongs of a two-part test. First, the contractor must
establish that its activity involves a unique federal interest warranting the
113. Id.
114. See id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum, 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966)).
115. See id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
116. See Akers, supra note 100, at 619; Restatement 2d Torts 402(a) (2001) (defining products liability).
117. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
118. See id. (noting that the results would be too broad because stock and standard equipment were
covered by the Feres conflict, yet too narrow since Feres only applies to military personnel, and not civilians
injured by contractor equipment).
119. Id. at 511.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2001).
121. SeeBoyle, 487U.S. at511.
122. Id.
123. Id.
2007 /Will Boyle Allow Private Military Contractors to Profit?
displacement of state law.124 Second, the contractor must show either that a
significant conflict exists between the identifiable unique federal policy or
interest and the operation of state law, or that the application of state law would
frustrate the specific operation of federal legislation.'25
The Court realized that scope of the displacement must be limited to the
"discretionary function exception."'' 26 In order to determine if actions by the
government contractor fell within the preempted discretionary function, the Court
adopted the elements for government contractor defense as enunciated in Tozer.1
27
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when: (1) the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the
supplier warned the United States about the dangers in using the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.'
28
The first two conditions for the defense assured that the claim fell within the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA. 129 The last condition ensured that
the contractor provided the government with all the necessary information to
make an informed discretionary decision.'3°
The government contractor defense in its purest Boyle form has been
successfully asserted by defendant military contractors in many recent cases.131
However, at least one circuit places great weight on the discussion by Justice
Scalia in Boyle that the government contractor defense is always a matter of fact
to be determined by the fact finder. 32 The Ninth Circuit has held in a number of
cases that dispute as to any of the elements of the defense are genuine issues of
material fact, and therefore should be submitted to the jury.33
C. Post-Boyle Expansion of the Government Contractor Defense
Much of the post-Boyle litigation has concerned questions not specifically
addressed by the Supreme Court.'" The case by case application of the test has
124. Id. at 507.
125. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
§4892.98 (Sept. 2005).
126. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512-13.




131. See, e.g., Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2001); Bailey v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 1993); Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 140 F.3d 654, 656
(6th Cir. 1998).
132. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 514 (holding that the court of appeals had acted in error if it had undertaken
to determine if the defense had been established, not whether no reasonable jury could have found for the
petitioner).
133. See generally Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990);
Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582, 584 (9th Cir. 1996).
134. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
480
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led to a substantial split in lower court case law.'35 Many courts find the Boyle
elements to be too fact specific and have reverted to an expansion of the
preemption reasoning to find application of the defense. 36
The Eleventh Circuit extended the government contractor defense from
specifically product liability claims to service contracts between the military and
private contractors. 37 The Court of Appeals analogized that the appropriate
service procedures under the government contract involved the same exercise of
discretion found to be a unique federal interest in Boyle.3 8 Finding the same
conflict under the FTCA, the court rearticulated the limiting elements of the
defense as more applicable to service contracts, specifically maintenance
contracts. 3 9 Recently, the government contractor defense as applied to service
contracts was successfully asserted in a wrongful death suit stemming from
contractor activities in Afghanistan.' 4° The district court held that Boyle did not
set all-or-nothing rules regarding different classes of contract, but required the
court to determine if the operation of state law presented a significant conflict
with a "unique federal interest."' 4'
Issues of contractor liability in times of war were addressed in Koohi v.
United States, in which heirs of deceased passengers of a civilian airliner, shot
down by a U.S. warship, filed claims against both the United States and the
contractor that manufactured the weapons system.'42 The Ninth Circuit held that
the claims against the United States were barred by sovereign immunity.' 43 The
appellate court had no problem finding that the deliberate decision by Congress
and the Executive to engage in hostile encounters with another sovereign was a
unique federal interest or policy.'" Like the Boyle court, the Ninth Circuit looked
government contractor defense applies to warning claims as well as design claims); Smith v. Xerox, 866 F.2d
135 (5th Cir. 1989) (dismissing manufacturing defect claims on the basis of government contractor defense).
135. Compare Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d. Cir. 1993) (holding that government
contractor defense applies to all government contractors), with In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d
806 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that government contractor defense applies only to military government
contractors).
136. See Dorse v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 898 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the three-prong
element analysis is not strictly applicable to warning-defect claims, and resorting to preemption analysis).
137. See Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329 (1lth Cir. 2003) (holding a contractor
liable under state law for conscientiously maintaining military aircraft according to specified procedures would
threaten government officials' discretion in precisely the same manner as holding contractors liable for
departing from design specifications).
138. id. at 1334.
139. See id. at 1335 (announcing elements for government contractor defense as applied to service
contracts: (1) the government approves reasonably precise maintenance procedures, (2) the maintenance
contractor conforms to those procedures, and (3) the maintenance contractor warns the government about
known dangers associated with the maintenance procedures).
140. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (M.D.Fla. 2006).
141. Id. at 1198.
142. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1992).
143. See id. at 1333 (holding that the claims fell within the express exception in the FTCA barring
claims arising out of combatant activities of the military or naval forces).
144. Id. at 1333-34.
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to the exceptions of the FTCA to find significant conflict. As to the claims
against the weapon system manufacturer, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit extended the analysis of Boyle to preempt claims against contractors that
would be barred by the combatant activities exception to the FTCA.
145
With one notable exception, the Supreme Court has declined to hear any
recent cases in order to refine the government contractor defense.'4 6 In
Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, the Court provided, in dicta, a
revised definition of the government contractor defense.'47 Malesko presented a
case where a prisoner filed a civil suit against the private government contractor
that ran the halfway house where the prisoner was assigned. 4 The Court found
that the prisoner did not have a private right of action against the contractor.
49
Although the Second Circuit opinion spent considerable time dealing with the
question of whether the defendant contractor would be eligible for the
government contractor defense,'5° the Supreme Court generally passed on the
issue once it found that no private right of action for the constitutional tort claim
was appropriate. However, in one clear footnote written in dictum, the Court
appears to have expanded the government contractor defense. '
The language used by Justice Scalia in Boyle limits the government
contractor defense to a specific set of facts:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but
not to the United States.'52
145. See id. at 1336-37 (noting that the imposition of liability against the contractors of the weapon
system would create a duty of care where the combatant activities exception intended to ensure that no duty
existed).
146. See, e.g., id., cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993); Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d
1311 (11' Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990).
147. Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,74 n.6 (2001).
148. See id. at 64 (noting that since 1981, the Bureau of Prisons had relied exclusively on contracts with
profit corporations and non-profit organizations to operate halfway house facilities to reintegrate federal
prisoners).
149. See id. at 74 (holding that a constitutional tort claim against an individual federal agent as
announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), not applicable against
corporations working under government contract).
150. See Malesko v. Correctional Serv. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the
government contractor defense would not be appropriate where the government had not directed the contractor
to institute the policies which led to the injury).
151. Compare Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988), with Correctional Serv. Corp.,
534 U.S. at 74 (J. Rehnquist stating that government contractor defense more broadly, and without the specific
limiting prongs outlined by J. Scalia in Boyle).
152. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500.
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As opposed to the fact specific test set forth by Justice Scalia in Boyle, in
Malesko, Justice Rehnquist provided a more generally applicable and less factual
specific interpretation of the government contractor defense:
Where the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that
is the subject of the claim, we have recognized this as a special
circumstance where the contractor may assert a defense. Boyle v. United
Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). The record here would provide no
basis for such a defense.
53
The Court in Malesko departed from the limited holding of Boyle by
removing the second two elements of the test. However, this may be a more
accurate definition of the defense in light of the expansion of its application in
the lower courts.'54 Without clear Supreme Court guidance on the matter, the
lower courts expansion of the doctrine to date appears consistent with Justice
Scalia's significant conflict reasoning if the FTCA exceptions are read broadly.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE IN SALEH AND IBRAHIM
The first issue in determining the applicability of the government contractor
defense to the Saleh and Ibrahim cases is whether the defendants can establish
that their activities are of a unique federal interest."' This comment assumes
arguendo that the defendant contractors can establish that the detention and
interrogation of foreign national prisoners at Abu Ghraib is an area of unique
federal interest.
However, this may not be readily apparent from the analysis in Boyle. First,
it is important to note that the line of cases from which Justice Scalia produces
the unique federal interest criteria specifically recognized that there is no "federal
common law."'56 Despite this pronouncement, a handful of cases have found "few
and restricted" instances where the federal common law was "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests."' 57 The Boyle court found a unique federal
interest in the effects of imposing liability on contractors engaged in military
153. Correctional Serv. Corp., 534 U.S. at 74 n.6.
154. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
the government contractor defense applies to warning claims as well as design claims); Carley v. Wheeled
Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d. Cir. 1993) (holding that the government contractor defense applies to all government
contractors) (emphasis added); Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 216 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding
that the government contractor defense is available to contractors who provide civilian products to civilian
government entities).
155. See generally Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-06 (holding that application of federal common law is only
applicable in a "few areas" involving unique federal interests).
156. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 516-18 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority disregards the long standing and clear pronouncement of Erie).
157. See generally Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
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procurement contracts with the U.S. government.' The tortured reasoning that a
suit between private entities implicates a unique federal interest because of the
increased costs the government would bear in direct relation to the imposition of
liability is not applicable when the thing being contracted for is of such limited
duration and specificity that any future cost burden would be too speculative.
However, the unique federal interest laid out in Koohi and McMahon v.
Presidential Airways, Inc. is arguably similar by analogy to the case of Abu
Ghraib. 5 9 There can be little doubt that unique federal interests are implicated
when the Executive and Legislative branches, with full public disclosure,
deliberately decide to engage in military hostilities with a foreign nation.
However, the actions of the private military contractor must also be of unique
federal interest, and as noted above, this comment will assume that their
contracted services are of a unique federal interest.
A. Is There a Significant Conflict Between the FTCA and State Tort Law as
Applied in Saleh or Ibrahim?
The government contractor defense as stated in Boyle and its progeny relied
on statutory exceptions to the FTCA for finding a conflict between unique federal
interests and the application of state tort law.' 6° Those exceptions provided a
boundary for Justice Scalia's finding of a "significant conflict";' 6 likewise in
Koohi.'62 Preemption of state tort law, however, would not be appropriate under
the theory of an express FICA exception in the cases of Saleh and Ibrahim. The
present cases illustrate factual situations that fall outside the preemption analysis
set forth in Boyle and arguably Koohi.
With respect to conflict preemption, Justice Scalia clearly stated that
"displacement of state law will occur only where a significant conflict exists
between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation of state law,
or application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal
legislations.' 63 In Boyle, the defendant contractors argued that state tort liability
conflicted with the grant of immunity under Feres for suits brought by military
158. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505-06.
159. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9b Cir. 1992); see also McMahon v. Presidential
Airways, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1189-90 (M.D.Fla. 2006) (holding that the deliberate decision by the
executive branch and Congress of sending U.S. armed forces to engage in an organized series of hostile
encounters on a significant scale with the military forces of another nation to be a unique federal interest which
is covered by the FTCA exemption).
160. See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (finding significant conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)); see also
Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1333 (finding significant conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 2680 ()).
161. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
162. See Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1333.
163. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08 (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)).
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personnel.' 6' However, the Court declined to follow the Feres conflict reasoning
and instead found conflict within the provisions of the FTCA.' 65 Justice Scalia
found that the federal statute expressly exempted the "discretionary nature" of
certain functions performed by government employees. 66 The Court felt the
balancing of "many technical, military, and even social considerations" including
safety versus combat effectiveness was a discretionary function best left to the
military, not the courts.'67
A similar analysis was used by the Ninth Circuit in Koohi.'6' The appellate
court found an express FTCA exemption for liability where the claim arose out
of combatant activities of the military forces during wartime.169 The Ninth
Circuit, however, did not require a formal declaration of war for the combatant
activities exception to apply.'7° The court found the principle purposes of tort
liability were not applicable to military service members acting under orders in
time of war. Specifically, the court reasoned that where the imposition of tort
liability would chill military actors, Congress could not have intended for
military members to be concerned with the possibility of tort liability when
making life and death decisions in the midst of combat.'7 ' As to the punitive and
compensatory aspects of tort liability, the court found that imposing civil tort
liability on American service members for their actions was not reasonable in
light of the inherently destructive nature of war.' 72 Where the actor was a military
service member using allegedly defective equipment in time of war, the appellate
court concluded that tort liability would not be appropriate.'
73
The present torture and abuse cases by private military contractors fall
outside either FTCA exemption noted above. Furthermore, state tort liability is
directly in line with the stated purposes of the TVPA' 74 because there is no
significant conflict between the substantial federal interests of protecting persons
from torture, and the application of state tort law to impose liability for tortuous
conduct.
164. See id. at 510 (refusing to apply the reasoning of Tozer, that military contractor liability conflicted
with the Feres doctrine since the increased cost of the contractor's tort liability would be added to the price of
the contract, and pass-through costs to the government would defeat the purpose of the governmental
immunity).
165. See id. at 510-11 (noting the both too broad and too narrow results of reliance on Feres, and finding
a statutory provision that circumscribes the outlines for "significant conflict" between federal interests and state
law).
166. Id. at 511-12.
167. Id.
168. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333-1334 (9 Cir. 1992).
169. See id. at 1333 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680).
170. Id. at 1334.
171. Id. at 1334-35.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 61 and surrounding text.
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First, the Boyle analysis is inapplicable where the government employee is
not performing a discretionary function, and where the activity performed is
specifically prohibited by federal law. Since torture inflicted by persons acting
under color of law is outlawed by the TVPA, Congress explicitly left the military
no room for discretion. Similarly, there should be no concern over increased
costs where the government would pay more for contracts because the contractor
is aware of the possible liability in breaking federal law when it enters the
contract. Furthermore, any contract entered into with the intent of breaking
federal law would be void as contrary to public policy.
Second, the Koohi analysis, and the FTCA in general, has a significant
weakness that the contractors must overcome. The specific wording of the FTCA
provides exemption for "combatant activities of the military or naval forces.'
7 5
The private military contractor is neither a member of the military nor naval
forces contemplated by Congress or the courts. 7 6 Furthermore, under the FTCA,
contractors are specifically not included as employees or agents of the U.S.
government. 177
One possible argument by the contractors is that by acting under color of
U.S. law, they were acting as agents of the U.S. military, and therefore entitled to
the FTCA exemption.17 First, this theory would be only available to the
individual contractors, and not their parent employers. 79 However, the Court has
noted that one of the distinguishing elements between contractors and agents is
the government's "power to control the detailed physical performance of the
contractor."' 80 As applied, the Court has found that because the government could
not directly supervise the individual employees, even if working under
government regulations, they were contractors and not agents of the
government. ' However, there is some debate as to whether the contractors in
Saleh and Ibrahim were working directly for and under the supervision of
military service members.'82 This issue only matters if the courts find that the
contractors were working without sufficient direct government supervision. If
they are outside government supervision, the contractors are not agents and are
eligible for the government contractor defense as a preliminary matter. But if the
175. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (2000) (emphasis added).
176. See generally Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 526 (1973) (finding
that an "employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the
military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official
capacity, but does not include any contractor with the United States).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000).
178. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-815 (1976).
179. Id.; Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41 (1965).
180. See Orleans, 425 U.S. at 814 (quoting Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973)).
181. See Logue, 412 U.S. at 527-28.
182. Compare Taguba Report, supra note 7 (noting that civilian contractors were under the operational
control of military members), with GAO Report, supra note 43 (stating that many military commanders believe
that the civilian contractors working with the military are outside operational control).
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contractor's physical performance is directly supervised by the government, then
it appears the contractor would be an agent of the government under the criteria
laid out in United States v. Orleans and would fall within the definition of
government employee under the FTCA.'83
The principle reasoning in Koohi for allowing the combat activities
exemption of state tort law is not applicable when the actors are not military
members. First, contractors are not currently acting as front line combatant
troops. Thus, the imposition of liability would not hinder the actions of combat
soldiers. Second, the contractor activities are usually limited in scale and
duration. Therefore, the effects are immediate and measurable unlike the large
scale operations that are undertaken by military units. Specific to Saleh and
Ibrahim, the contractors are not accused of abuses outside the prison by any
number of personnel the plaintiffs encountered; only specific tortuous acts
committed by named individuals are alleged.'8
One final argument the defendant contractors may make for significant
conflict is that the FTCA provides an express exemption for claims that arise in a
foreign country.'5 While case law on this issue is scant, two district courts have
held that the test to determine the applicability of this exemption as "whether the
place in which [the claim] arose was territory subject to the sovereignty of
another nation, and whether the liability asserted is one depending on the laws of
a foreign power."'' 6 Since the alleged activities happened during the time of the
U.S.-run Coalitional Provisional Government, and in light of Paul Bremer's edict
giving private military contractors' immunity in Iraqi courts, it appears that the
defendant contractors would not be subject to the sovereignty of another nation
or laws.
A number of other traditional policy reasons supporting the viability of the




However, two significant policy considerations should be carefully evaluated.
First, courts have traditionally given great deference to military decisionmaking
based on their lack of expertise in dealing with such matters.'88 However, this
theory is only applicable in areas where the court questions the decisions of the
183. See 425 U.S. at 813-15; 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000) (defining parties covered by the FTCA).
184. See Saleh Complaint, supra note 51; Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000).
186. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1199 (M.D.Fla. 2006) (quoting
Pignataro v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 151, 152 (E.D.N.Y.1959)).
187. See generally John J. Michels, Jr., The Government Contractor Defense: The Limits of Immunity
After Boyle, 33 A. F. L. REV. 147, 150 (1990) (outlining the following policy considerations behind the
government contractor defense: "the inapplicability of normal tort law theories to the procurement of
government equipment; the lack of expertise in the courts to deal with military equipment procurement;
potential increased cost of government designed equipment; the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and the ability
of the [flederal [glovernment to get goods corresponding to government needs").
188. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to
the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.").
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military personnel, and not simply in the application of the TVPA. Second, the
military and the federal government's ability to accomplish its national security
and foreign policy objectives is a valid argument for judicial deference to the
executive branch and its methods. On the other hand, the theory that failure to
hold persons and corporations accountable for the very same crimes committed
by the recently overthrown leaders of both Afghanistan and Iraq presents a
significant threat to viable Arab-Western relations is equally compelling." 9
Finally, Saleh presents an interesting dilemma for the courts in a preemption
analysis. Preemption generally arises where a significant federal interest conflicts
with applicable state law, or where the federal government has exercised superior
authority in a field by enacting a complete scheme of regulation.' " Presently, the
courts will face a situation where military interests, national security, and foreign
policy-all significant federal interests conflicting with state tort law-abuts
against federal and state law that prohibit the actions taken by the contractors.
The courts should respect the expressed intentions of Congress when it passed
the TVPA and find that there is no conflict where the Legislature has clearly
spoken, and that state tort law can exist peaceably with that statute.
B. A Boyle Analysis of Private Military Contractors Working in Paramilitary
Roles
While Boyle has been extended a number of times since the Court granted
immunity to military contractors acting in accordance with approved
specifications that relate known dangers, a district court judge in the District of
Columbia recently refused to extend the government contractor defense to
intentional torts committed by non-governmental contract employees.' 9' The
defendant's corporation, Titan, attempted to assert that they were immune from
suit. The court distinguished immunity from preemption. The court noted that
immunity is not an affirmative defense that may ultimately be put to a trier of
fact, but a procedural decision questioning whether a defendant is entitled to
freedom from suit.' 92 On the other hand, preemption under the government
contractor defense is an affirmative defense as outlined in Boyle.'93 With an
affirmative defense, there are both procedural and factual elements that can be
determined from the record.
189. See generally Sherry Ricchiardi, Missed Signals, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REV. (Aug./Sept. 2004),
available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3716; Jim Miklaszewski, David Gregory & Alicia Jennings,
Abuse Scandal "Terrible'for U.S., Powell Concedes, MSNBC (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/4855930/ (quoting former Sec. of State Colin Powell, who noted the fervor over the Abu Ghraib
scandal was a pressing and recurrent issue in a recent conference in Jordan).
190. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (outlining general law of field and express preemption).
191. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.D.C. 2005).
192. See id. at 18 n.5 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).
193. See Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Under the Boyle analysis, the first step involves a judicial evaluation of
whether the actions under the contract implicate uniquely federal interests. 94 The
Ibrahim court found that the treatment of prisoners during wartime qualifies as a
unique federal interest.'95 Following that finding, the second part of Boyle applies
the conditions first outlined in Tozer relating to design defects in military
equipment.96 At this point the traditional government contractor analysis fails.
The first element of the government contractor defense requires the approval
of reasonably precise specifications by the United States. It is unlikely that the
United States approved the use of torture in violation of U.S. and international
law in its contract specifications. Contract records with CACI show that for $19.9
million, CACI was to provide interrogators and intelligence experts to the U.S.
Army.' 97 In the statement of work attached to the contract, although written by a
CACI employee in violation of Government Services Administration (GSA)
conflict of interest guidelines,' interrogators will "conduct interrogations ... [in
accordance with] local [standard operating procedures] and higher-authority
regulations."' 99 In applying the government contractor defense, a number of cases
have found that leaving too much discretion to the contractor for the design or the
completion of the contracted services does not meet the first element of the Boyle
test.2°° In at least one of the present contracts, the contractor wrote the statement
of work or specifications. 0' This reasonably appears to be either "rubber
stamping" the specifications of the contractor or leaving the discretion up to the
contractor, and both are outside the "continuous back-and-forth review process"
or the drafting and participating process found to be sufficient to meet the
reasonably precise specifications element. °2
194. See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (holding displacement of state law will
only occur where a "significant conflict" exists between an identifiable "federal policy or interest and the
[operation] of state law").
195. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
196. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
197. OF-347, Contract Order for Supplies and Services entered into between CACI, International and
the U.S. Dept. of the Interior, March 1, 2004, 1, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/CACI
_ordersAll.pdf (containing 572 pages of payments, addendums, statements of work, etc.). The fact that the
contract is with the U.S. Dept. of the Interior for "technology services" does not discount the possibility of the
government contractor defense. See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d. Cir. 1993) (holding that
government contractor defense applies to all government contractors).
198. David Phinney, Prison Interrogation for Profit, CorpWatch, Sept. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.warprofiteers.com/article.php?id=l 1524.
199. OF-347, supra note 197 (stating that contractors are non-combatants and are not authorized to be
armed).
200. See, e.g., Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
rubber stamp approval by the government did not satisfy the reasonably precise specifications prong); Johnson
v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp 212 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding the first element not met where the government
delegated the design discretion to the contractor).
201. David Phinney, Prison Interrogation for Profit, CORPWATCH, Sept. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.warprofiteers.com/article.php?id=l 1524.
202. See generally Russek v. Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277 (D.N.J. 1996); Maguire v. Hughs Aircraft
Corp., 912 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1990).
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The second element requires that the contractor conform to the reasonably
precise approved specifications. This would be a question of fact for a jury.
Unlike military equipment where the court can take notice that the great number
of pieces worked as expected or the military ran additional tests to confirm
conformity, in the case of prisoner interrogations, there is no method of
determining conformity with specifications without an ad hoc analysis. In the
case of the CACI contract, the statement of work explicitly calls for the
contractor to "conduct interrogations ... [in accordance with] local [standard
operating procedures] and higher-authority regulations., 203 After the Abu Ghraib
scandal broke, the Army tasked General Taguba to conduct an investigation of
the incident. In interviewing witnesses for his report, General Taguba specifically
asked about the promulgation and familiarity with established standard operating
procedures.204 The interviews demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of
the standard operating procedures, or even that they were distributed to the lower
205level military members and contractors.
Even if other standard operating procedures approved the use of physical,
mental, and emotional interrogation, the TVPA specifically forbids the infliction
of severe physical and mental pain or suffering.2 6 The TVPA would be
considered a higher-authority regulation with which CACI was to act in
compliance. It appears unlikely that the defendant contractors conformed to the
specifications given that most prior cases hold that military approval of the work
product or services, or inspection and testing by the government of the equipment
produced satisfactory results.2 °7
The third element under Boyle is that the contractor warns the United States
about the dangers in using the equipment that were known to the supplier but not
to the United States.0  This comment will assume that the third element of the
Boyle analysis could not have been met by the defendant contractors. It seems
unreasonable to assume without further evidence that the contractors explained
203. Supra note 199 and accompanying text.
204. See Affidavit of John Israel, Titan Employee, Feb. 12, 2004, at 6-8, Annex 91 to the Taguba Report
(stating that he "may have read" the Geneva Convention, as it "might" have been part of the papers given to
him during his hour long indoctrination briefing upon arrival at Abu Ghraib).
205. See Taguba Report, supra note 7, at 24, 31.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2004) (defining (1) "torture" as an act committed by a person acting under the
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control; and (2)
"severe mental pain or suffering" as the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: (A) the intentional
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or
threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death,
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality).
207. See generally Fagans v. Unisys Corp., 945 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that conformity with
the specifications was found where the government inspected, certified, and accepted the equipment for use).
208. See Boyle v. United Tech Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
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the risk of breaking federal law to the military or Department of the Interior.
However, in light of the Executive Branches' policies concerning torture as a
viable interrogation method, the contractors may only have to show that the
United States knew of the risks it was undertaking when it contracted for the
services.2 °9
C. Does the Use of Private Military Contractors in Traditionally Paramilitary
Roles Undermine the Policy Rationale behind the Government Contractor
Defense?
While Boyle clearly announced the rationale behind the government
contractor defense as the protection of unique federal interests from significant
conflict with the operation of state law, cases such as Malesko leave some doubt
as to whether the government contractor defense would be applicable in the Saleh
and Ibrahim cases. There are two clear indicators that the use of private military
contractors in traditionally paramilitary roles would undermine the rationale
behind the government contractor defense.
First, in Malesko, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the Second
Circuit's narrow reading of the government contractor defense.2 ° While possibly
expanding the scope of the defense, Justice Rehnquist was agreeing to the fact
that the Bureau of Prisons had not exercised its discretionary control over the
policies and practices of Correctional Services Corporation ("CSC"). 2"' This lack
of interaction fails the first element of the Boyle analysis calling for reasonably
precise specifications. Based on this reasoning, it is unlikely that Titan and CACI
can show that they were acting on very specific and nondiscretionary government
instructions when they participated in torture.
Second, the Court has demonstrated in Malesko that where another remedy is
available, suit against corporations under contract with the government is not
warranted.1 2 Furthermore, the imposition of liability on the corporation would
have severe consequences on the public treasury.2 3 The Court has found no
private right of action against government contractors when those "special
factors" were present in the facts.24 However, in Saleh and Ibrahim, two facts
distinguish those "special factors." First, in light of the sovereign immunity by
the U.S. military and the pronouncement that contractors had immunity in Iraqi
courts, the suit against the private military contractor may be the only remedy
209. See generally R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Helped Set the Course for Detainees:
Justice Nominee's Hearings Likely to Focus on Interrogation Policies, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2005 at Al
(reporting on a White House memo outlining recommended interrogation techniques that included physical and
physiological torture).
210. See Malesko v. Correctional Service Corp., 534 U.S. 61, 73-74 (2001).
211. Id. at n.6 ("The record here would provide no basis for [the government contractor] defense.").
212. Id. at 69-70.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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available to the plaintiffs. Second, the cost burden will not be to the public
treasury, but solely to the contractor.25 There are very few contracts that the
government can enter into that would force the conflict between contract
execution and the TVPA. For that reason, there would not be substantial future
increased costs to the government.
Finally, the FTCA expressly waives immunity for agents of the government
216acting within scope of their employment. If the traditional military role is
outsourced to private military contractors acting within a standard military chain
of command, then a reasonable argument could be made that the individual
contractors are acting as agents of the U.S. government. If that is true, then the
issue before the courts would be: were the agents acting within the scope of their
employment while they were torturing prisoners in violation of the TVPA and the
Geneva Convention? That presents a question not only of policy and legal
interpretation, but one that defines us as Americans. Is it permissible for
American agents to torture foreign nationals in the name of preventing harm to
American citizens? Congress and the international community have spoken loud
and clear. It should be equally clear to the courts that persons who have been
tortured and abused by private military corporations profiting from those acts
have a remedy, and furthermore, that the contractors have no defense to those
actions, either legally or morally.
V. CONCLUSION
Any common law legal standard must undergo revisions and iterations to
adjust to nuances and factual circumstances it confronts. Private military
corporations are attempting to intertwine two separate and distinct common law
affirmative defenses. The government contractor defense and the extension of
sovereign immunity are both powerful litigation tools available to the corporate
defendant. As indicated in Ibrahim, the lower courts are already unsure exactly
how to approach the unique situation where private military contractors working
for the military commit tortuous acts on the civilian population abroad.
2 7
As to the issue of the government contractor defense, it appears clear from
the reasoning laid out in Boyle, that despite the Court's tacit approval of the
defense's expansion, the government contractor defense would not be applicable
in the case of an intentional tort committed by a private military contractor in
paramilitary roles. First, the preemption analysis is sufficiently different from
that both Boyle and Koohi that any unique federal interest would be subordinate
215. Compare FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (finding that liability costs would be paid from
the public coffers), with Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the government contractor defense did not apply to non-military contracts, because the increased costs of
liability were not likely to be passed on to the government in a less risky context).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2001).
217. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2005).
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to the TVPA and not conflict with applicable state law. In light of the present
political and national security climate, a court could find a unique federal interest
that may warrant preemption. However, it would still be difficult for the
contractors to assert that they meet all of the elements laid out in Boyle.
Finally, by extending the government contractor defense to private military
contractors acting in traditionally paramilitary roles, the courts would circumvent
two clear edicts. First, the deterrence value found in Malesko of holding the
corporation liable would be lost if the corporation were not held liable for the
actions of its employees' within the scope of that employment. Second, the clear
intent of Congress to waive sovereign immunity for specific actions by agents of
the government would be thwarted.

